of Social Unity—A Problem in Social Psychology. Gault adopts an extreme individualistic position, deriving the sense of social unity from a man's imagery of the behaviour of his fellow-beings, his realisation of their purposes, ideals, and felt needs; and from his consequent emotional experiences. It is hard to see how such factors could be effectively operative apart from the prior existence of that very social sense which they are supposed to produce.

Three studies still remain. One is an extremely well-executed piece of introspection by Karl M. Dallenbach, on *The Psychology of Blindfold Chess;* in another H. C. Stevens describes clearly a proposed *Revision of the Rossolimo Tests;* and finally W. S. Foster presents *A Bibliography of the Published Writings of Edward Bradford Titchener.*

Containing, probably, no work of really first-class importance, this volume of studies is yet well worthy of careful perusal. In its way it is an excellent indication of the present state of experimental psychology, so far as laboratory work is concerned. Here are displayed the eager quest for facts; the search often, as it seems, directed by little beyond mere curiosity; the many investigators setting to work by the most diverse methods upon the most varied problems. It is impossible to avoid wondering at times whither all this largely uncorrelated activity is leading, and whether much of it is not waste of effort. Yet there is something to be said for Pillsbury's pleasure at the mere activity. And perhaps the old belief which his essay again expresses, is well founded: that somehow, as a result of this mass of varied effort, the complete book of the story of human experience will be written. Only it would seem to be an advantage if the collaborators would take pains to profit more fully from the fact of their collaboration.

F. C. BARTLETT.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1916-1917. Williams & Norgate. Pp. 497.

As the years go on the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society grow fatter and fatter. This is not to be regretted, for they really form a valuable contribution to philosophic thought, and will be interesting to the historian by showing philosophic ideas in England in the making.

The present volume contains discussions of fifteen subjects, but two of these discussions are symposia to which several writers contributed. The contents may roughly be grouped as follows: (*a*) Two contributions to our knowledge of the physical world, *viz.*, the symposium on: *Are the Materials of Sense Affections of the Mind?* in which Messrs. Moore, Johnson (*mirabile dictu!*), Dawes Hicks, J. A. Smith, and James Ward took part; and Prof. Dawes Hicks's paper on *The Basis of Critical Realism.* (*b*) Three on epistemological questions, *viz.*, *The Problem of Recognition*, by Dr.

Wildon Carr; the *Organisation of Thought*, by Prof. Whitehead; and *Fact and Truth*, by Principal Lloyd Morgan. (*c*) Two on value-theory, *viz.*, *Valuation and Existence*, by Mr. Bartlett, and *Our Knowledge of Value*, by Mr. Pickard-Cambridge. (*d*) Two on general metaphysics, *viz.*, *The Conception of a Cosmos*, by Prof. Mackenzie, and *Relation and Coherence*, by Miss Stebbing. (*e*) Two on politics, *viz.*, *The Function of the State in promoting the Unity of Mankind*, by Prof. Bosanquet, and a symposium on *Ethical Principles of Social Reconstruction*, to which Messrs. Jacks, Shaw, Burns, and Miss Oakely contributed. (*f*) Lastly four on the history of philosophy, *viz.*, *Monism in the Light of Recent Developments in Philosophy*, by Mr. Joad; *The Notion of Knowledge as conceived by Malebranche*, by Mr. Ginsberg; *Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Plotinus*, by Dean Inge; and *Hume's Theory of the Credibility of Miracles*, by the present reviewer.

It is impossible to summarise, much less to criticise, such a large mass of material. I shall therefore content myself with a few remarks on articles which particularly interested me in each section. Needless to say, I do not mean to imply that articles which I do not explicitly discuss are less valuable than those which I do.

(*a*) Prof. Dawes Hicks's article on Critical Realism is an extremely valuable one. He begins by showing that epistemology in the sense of criticism of categories is a necessary part even of the most realistic philosophy. Then he argues that perception is essentially an act of discrimination and not one of synthesis, and that physical and physiological processes call forth these acts at given moments, but do not create their objects or any part of them. Acts have contents, but the content of an act is never its object nor a quality of its object. Russell's theory of the physical world is criticised on the following grounds: (i) sense-data are the products of analysis of developed perception not primitive materials; (ii) there is no such thing as mere acquaintance, and the Russell-Whitehead theory of physical objects makes them more radically subjective even than Kant's; (iii) unsensed *sensibilia* never can be sensed, and are in the position of things-in-themselves; (iv) the distinction between appearance and reality breaks out even within the world of sense-data. As regards these criticisms I agree entirely with (iii) which I have myself insisted upon in the *Proceedings* for 1914-1915 (pp. 236-237). But I think that something like acquaintance is needed even on Dr. Dawes Hicks's theory, for we need to be acquainted with a vague mass before we can perform acts of discrimination upon it. That sense-data may have parts which we cannot distinguish, and relations which we do not detect is true, but not, so far as I can see, any objection to Russell's theory; we only have *appearances* when something with a positive sensible character, such as a visible ellipse, is contrasted with something with an incompatible character, such as a round penny, which is yet regarded as specially

correlated with the penny. I still cannot follow Prof. Dawes Hicks's view about sensible appearances; I do not see how a visible ellipse can be a 'way' or 'mode' of looking at a round penny.

Passing to the nature of mind, Prof. Dawes Hicks rejects the view that it consists of acts differing only in the objects to which they are directed, and also the view of neutral monism. He is nearer the first view, but differs by giving each act a content, correlated, if I understand him aright, with its object. The relation of act to content is compared with that of colour and red. Contents can be revived, but it is not explained what precisely this means. Does it mean 'acts with the same content can recur'? If so, do they have the same object? Surely not, as a rule. If not what becomes of the correlation of content and object?

(*b*) Dr. Carr's article on Recognition deals with the familiarity of an object which we feel because of an earlier experience, and the ability of animals to deal with certain situations for the first time when they can have had no previous personal experience of them. Our feeling of familiarity, he argues, does not in general depend upon memory of the past experience and comparison with it. This seems to me to be true. Nor does it depend on repetition, for there is none. Here I cannot follow Dr. Carr. I agree (*a*) that there is never complete repetition, and (*b*) that no amount of repetition would be a *sufficient* condition of the feeling of familiarity. But (*c*) it seems certain that when I visit a town for a second time my sense-data must be very similar to those of which I was aware on my first visit, and that if they were not my judgment that it is the *same* town would be baseless. According to Dr. Carr all my experience leaves traces which at any given moment constitute a total system into which a present experience must fit itself. This again seems to me true, and to be a necessary condition for recognition though not a sufficient one. For, since, on this view, *all* my present experiences have to fit into this frame, we have no explanation why some only of them are accompanied by the special feeling of familiarity. The 'instinctive recognition' of young animals, Dr. Carr explains by a metaphysical theory of the unity and continuity of 'life'; but I think we need to be much more certain than we are at present as to whether these external acts are the accompaniments of a feeling of familiarity before it becomes worth while to theorise about their conditions.

(*c*) Mr. Bartlett's paper on Valuation and Existence is extremely interesting. He argues that the earliest stage of value arises from the mere fact that some stimuli are responded to by a given individual more readily than others. At this stage there is a total mass consisting of act, object, and feeling, but these are not discriminated by the individual. There is thus no judgment or Annahme of existence. At the next stage the feeling is discriminated from the act and the object, but these are not discriminated from each other. (It may be worth while to point out that at these two stages, though there is no explicit judgment of existence any

more than there is complete discrimination of the three factors in the complex, the complex and its factors do actually exist.) At the next stage, which is the first at which definite judgments of value occur, the three factors are discriminated; æsthetic and economic valuation applies to objects, moral valuation to acts. Æsthetic judgments seem to contain no reference to existence, economic ones contain a reference to actual or possible human needs, moral ones only apply to acts thought of as occurring. Lastly there is no reason to identify value with something common to the various specific kinds of value such as beauty, goodness, etc. To say that a thing has value may only mean that it has one or more of these specific characteristics. Again value belongs to objects, not to objectives, and we may know that a thing is valuable without knowing that it exists, but we cannot know that it is valuable if we know nothing further about its nature as Urban seems to suggest.

(*d*) Miss Stebbing's contention in her paper on Relation and Coherence is that the doctrine of external relations, and Mr. Bradley's argument against relations alike depend on viewing terms as something which 'get into' relations with each other instead of being, together with their relations, factors in a complex whole. In her view some terms are quite independent of their relations, *e.g.*, numbers, others differ when related by a certain relation from what they were when not related by it. *E.g.*, a man alters in some of his qualities when he becomes a father. I do not think that Miss Stebbing sufficiently distinguishes the three questions: (i) If xRy changes to xSz does this logically necessitate a qualitative change in x? (ii) May it be followed causally by a change in x's qualities. (iii) Given a relation may *any* sort of term be a referent or a relatum to it, or is there an *à priori* restriction of referents and relata to certain classes? I presume that Russell would answer (ii) in the affirmative and accept the second alternative in (iii) and merely deny (i).

(*e*) Prof. Bosanquet is concerned to answer objections brought against his theory of the state by Mr. Cole, Mr. Russell, and others, and to consider what light it has to throw on the question of an international authority. He argues that the state cannot be compared with any other association (i) because it expresses the general will, and (ii) because it is necessary to have some institution whose orders shall be final as against the conflicts of other institutions. Essentially a state exists to contribute to the general good in a certain specific way peculiar to each state. War between states arises mainly from their own internal imperfections. An international authority is not likely to work because it is doubtful whether there is any general will common to all civilised nations. With much that Prof. Bosanquet says I agree, but he also makes some very astonishing statements. In the first place the general will seems to me to be either a pure fiction or at most a high-sounding way of saying that a government cannot be carried on if it too persistently opposes the very strong desires of an influential

section of its subjects. Prof. Bosanquet's contention that the will of any particular citizen is abstract and fragmentary compared with the general will of his state is to me simply unintelligible. Nor does this view seem consistent with the writer's quite just contention that it is absurd to judge a state by the same moral criteria as a private citizen, since it has entirely different tasks, and acts in an entirely different medium. Surely if this be so, there is no comparison between the will of a citizen and the 'will' of a state.

Again, Prof. Bosanquet argues quite plausibly that he has as much right to discuss 'the state' and not 'states' as a professor of engineering has to discuss 'the steam engine'. To this, however, we may reply that any existing steam-engine resembles 'the steam engine' very much more than any existing state resembles 'the state' as described by Prof. Bosanquet. If books about 'the steam-engine' discussed an engine which was (i) worked by petrol and (ii) disobeyed the laws of thermodynamics, they would not throw much light on any actual steam-engine. Now Prof. Bosanquet's theory of 'the state' does seem to be analogous to such a theory of 'the steam-engine'. For (i) all actual states are worked mainly by inertia, fear, and various tribal illusions on the part of the governed, and ambition, interest, and occasionally a genuine desire for the general welfare on the part of the governing class.[1] And (ii) a will which is the will of no one in particular is as much a fiction as a heat-engine disobeying the second law of thermodynamics. As to an international authority, I am afraid it is likely to break down, but not for the reasons that Prof. Bosanquet gives. The reasons seem to be (i) that it merely has its obvious rationality to recommend it, and it has no tribal illusions for it and all tribal prejudices against it. (ii) It is doubtful whether in the most favourable circumstances it could exercise so much power compared with the separate states as to make resistance to its orders practically hopeless, as is the resistance of a criminal (unless he be very wealthy or a member of an important trades union, or has a pull on some member of the governing class) against his state. (iii) Prof. Bosanquet is, however, quite correct in holding that a third difficulty is that questions arise between states where it is impossible to say which is right, and where it is impossible to judge by established legal principles. Such questions arise over national expansion, and may be compared with a strike where the workmen consider that they are entitled to an entirely new standard of life and culture, and the masters consider that they are defending such culture as already exists against a levelling down of everything to a state of universal mediocrity.

[1] In fact the attitude of most reflecting people in England, France, and America, at any rate, towards their government is not that they *will* its actions or respect its spokesmen but that they *tolerate* them, having no hope of substituting anything better. The attitude of the poor is more definitely hostile even than this, except in moments of patriotic excitement.

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